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Abstract 
Participants in the West of Scotland Twenty-07 study took reaction time tasks and the 
Alice Heim 4 Part 1 test (AH4) of intelligence twice, 13 years apart. Cross-lagged 
associations between speed of processing and AH4 were examined using latent 
variables in structural equation modelling. The stability coefficient of the latent trait 
of processing speed across 13 years was .49, and of AH4 was .89. There was a 
significant association (-.21) between AH4 at age 56 and speed of processing at age 
69, but not vice versa. The results fail to support the theory that processing speed is a 
foundation for successful cognitive ageing, but support a hypothesis which suggests 
that higher general intelligence might be associated with lifestyle and other factors 
that preserve processing speed. 
 
Keywords: aging, intelligence, reaction time, processing speed, longitudinal study, 
structural equation modelling 
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Smarter in Middle age, Faster in Old Age: A Cross-lagged Panel Analysis of Reaction 
Time and Cognitive Ability Over 13 Years in the Scottish Twenty-07 Study 
As the proportion of older people in modern societies increases, there has been a 
greater emphasis on understanding the changes associated with ageing, especially 
cognitive ageing (House of Lords, 2005; Stern & Carstensen, 2000). Cognitive 
decline is often rated as the most feared aspect of ageing, and cognitive ageing is one 
of the costliest medical burdens for society (Martin, 2004; Stern & Carstensen, 2000). 
Cognitive deterioration is associated with loss of independence, lower quality of life, 
and an increased risk of mortality. Like other aspects of physical bodily functions, 
some mental functions decline on average as people grow older. Age-related declines 
in reasoning, memory, processing speed and other mental functions have been 
demonstrated in cross-sectional and longitudinal studies (Hedden & Gabrieli, 2004; 
Salthouse & Ferrer-Caja, 2003; Schaie, 2005). There are marked individual 
differences in cognitive ageing, with some people declining more over time than 
others (Schaie, 2005; Wilson et al., 2002). Finding the sources of these individual 
differences is a research priority. 
Mental speed, or speed of information processing, has a long history as a 
potential explanatory construct in intelligence differences, cognitive development and 
ageing (Birren, 1964; Salthouse, 1996). It is generally assessed by tasks that involve 
items with simple mental content which would rarely or never result in incorrect 
solutions if there were no time pressure (Deary 2000; Salthouse, 1996). Thus, for 
example, psychometric tests like the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale’s digit symbol 
subtest or similar coding tasks are often employed to assess speed of information 
processing (Finkel, Reynolds, McArdle, & Pedersen, 2007; Hoyer, Stawski, 
Wasylyshyn, & Verhaeghen, 2004; Lemke & Zimprich, 2005; Salthouse, 2004; 
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Zimprich & Martin, 2002; Zimprich, Hofer, & Aarsten, 2004). On the other hand, 
arguably lower-level and more fundamental tasks such as reaction times, and even 
psychophysical backward-masking tasks such as inspection time, have also been used 
as processing speed measures (Deary, 2000; Salthouse, 1996; Hertzog, Dixon, 
Hultsch, & MacDonald, 2003). All of these processing speed measures are associated 
with psychometric intelligence differences in normal adults (Deary, 2000; Deary, Der, 
& Ford, 2001; Grudnik & Kranzler, 2001; Hoyer, Stawski, Wasylyshyn, & 
Verhaegen, 2004). Performance on all of them improves with development from 
childhood to adulthood, and declines with age (Der & Deary, 2006; Edmonds et al., 
2008; Hoyer et al., 2004; Kail, 1991; Nettelbeck & Rabbitt, 1992; Salthouse, 2004). 
The place of processing speed within an explanatory account of cognitive 
differences and cognitive ageing is ambiguous and disputed. On the one hand, speed 
of information processing may be viewed as just one aspect of cognitive functioning 
that deteriorates along with a number of others, with which it is correlated, and with 
which it might share aetiology (Finkel, Reynolds, McArdle, & Pedersen, 2005; 
Salthouse, 2004; Wilson et al., 2002). On the other hand, processing speed is 
sometimes viewed as a more fundamental construct, one which might explain some of 
the variance and age changes in other mental abilities, which it does more or less 
successfully (Finkel et al., 2007; Salthouse, 1996, 2001; Salthouse & Ferrer-Caja, 
2003; Zimprich, 2002; Zimprich & Martin, 2002). In this latter view, speed of 
information processing is a “fundamental property of the nervous system” (Madden, 
2001, p. 288), that subserves a diverse range of other mental functions; when 
processing speed is slower, the other mental functions are less well implemented. 
Some of the evidence that underpins a processing speed account of cognitive 
ability and ageing is cross-sectional. There are moderately strong correlations 
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between psychometric intelligence and non-psychometric processing speed measures 
such as reaction times and inspection times in normal adults (Deary, Der, & Ford, 
2001; Grudnik & Kranzler, 2001), in children (Edmonds et al., in press; Fry & Hale, 
1996), and older people (Nettelbeck & Rabbitt, 1992). Adjusting for individual 
differences in measures of processing speed such as digit symbol and reaction time 
often eliminates a majority of the age-related variation in more complex mental 
abilities (Salthouse, 1996; Zimprich, 2002). A meta-analysis showed that processing 
speed acted as a strong partial mediator of the effects of age on fluid intelligence and 
episodic memory (Verhaegen & Salthouse, 1997). On the other hand, Salthouse 
(2001), for example, did not find that a model which used perceptual speed as a 
mediating latent variable for the influence of age on other cognitive latent variables 
(reasoning, spatial visualization, recall memory, and paired associate memory) had 
better fit to the data than models which viewed age as having an effect on general 
cognitive ability, or reasoning as the mediating variable. The issue of whether 
processing speed is a correlate or cause of mental abilities cannot be settled with 
cross-sectional data. 
Only limited longitudinal data exist on the processing speed hypothesis of 
cognitive ageing, as emphasised by Lemke and Zimprich (2005). There is evidence 
that the mediating effect of processing speed on the effect of age on other cognitive 
abilities is much less substantial using longitudinal designs (Sliwinski & Hofer, 1999; 
Zimprich, 2002). For example, Zimprich (2002) found that digit symbol test scores 
accounted for about 85% of the age-related effects on other Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale subtests in a cross-sectional analysis, but only 4% in a longitudinal 
analysis with the same participants. Some have found larger mediating effects, but 
they are still far short of cross-sectional effects. For example, over a 4-year period in 
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older people, changes in speed of processing correlated .61 (37% shared variance) 
with changes in memory (Lemke & Zimprich, 2005), and .53 (28% shared variance) 
with changes in fluid intelligence (Zimprich & Martin, 2002). Hertzog, Dixon, 
Hultsch, & MacDonald (2003) modelled cognitive changes across six years in the 
Victoria Longitudinal Study. They found some evidence for age-related changes in 
working memory and episodic memory being partly mediated via perceptual speed. 
On the other hand, they also report good fit to a model that construed perceptual speed 
and reaction time changes as a part of the general cognitive change that takes place 
with age. This ambiguity is similar to that reported by Salthouse (2001) with cross-
sectional data. 
Analyses of the Swedish Adoption/Twin Study of Aging have been especially 
informative. Longitudinal data with up to four testing occasions in old age found that 
for processing speed—measured using the psychometric tests of symbol digit and 
figure identification—the intercept was associated with reduced acceleration in the 
decline of memory and spatial ability, and that the slope of processing speed change 
was moderately associated with the slopes of verbal ability, spatial ability and 
memory (Finkel et al., 2005). Subsequent analyses, using bivariate dual change score 
models, and with up to five measurements occasions and 16 years of follow up, found 
some evidence that processing speed had a dynamic influence on later memory and 
spatial ability (Finkel et al., 2007). The same was not true between processing speed 
and verbal ability. Indeed, the dynamic association between verbal ability and later 
processing speed was significant, but not vice versa; these two cross-lagged 
associations were not significantly different. These analyses were performed using 
psychometric tests of processing speed. 
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There is still an open question concerning whether processing speed changes 
with age may be considered as a partial explanatory foundation for more general 
cognitive ability changes. Longitudinal data are especially valuable, but are rare, and 
rarer still with regard to large, population-representative samples tested across a long 
period of time. Moreover, it is important, if possible, to have measures of processing 
speed that are not complex psychometric tests, such as digit symbol-like tasks. In the 
present study we examine a large, population-representative, narrow age sample of 
people tested on simple and choice reaction times and a psychometric test of general 
intelligence, first at age 56 years and then again at age 69. We examine the 
associations between these variables for lead-lag effects that might contribute to the 
understanding of the importance of speed of information processing in the ageing of 
cognitive abilities from middle to old age. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants in the present study are drawn from the West of Scotland Twenty-
07 study—a population-based, longitudinal, multiple cohort study aimed at 
investigating the processes which create and maintain socially structured health 
inequalities. The design and sampling of the Twenty-07 study were described by 
Ford, Ecob, Hunt, Macintyre, and West (1994) and Macintyre et al. (1989). Briefly, 
the study comprises three age cohorts aged around 15, 35 and 55 years in 1987, each 
to be followed up for 20 years. They were selected as a two-stage random sample of 
the population of the Central Clydeside Connurbation, a large urban area in the west 
of Scotland centred on Glasgow City. The data used here pertain to the oldest cohort 
from waves 1 and 4 of the Twenty-07 study, which began, respectively, in 1988 and 
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2000, these being the only occasions when the Alice Heim and reaction time tests 
were both administered. No equivalent data are available for the two younger cohorts. 
There were 679 people in total (303 men, 376 women) who met our selection 
criteria. Using the UK’s standard six-category grouping of occupations, the sample 
was divided, from most professional to most manual, as follows: class I = 47, class II 
= 156, class IIIN = 108, class IIIM = 227, class IV = 98, class V = 43. As described 
elsewhere, the sample is unusually valuable in being representative of the background 
population (Deary & Der, 2005a, Table 1). The mean age of the sample at wave 1 was 
56.1 (N = 679, SD = 0.6, range = 54.2 to 58.3), and at wave 4 was 68.9 (N = 524, SD 
= 1.0, range = 66.6 to 72.9). Therefore, the chronological age range at both waves was 
very narrow. Data were collected by trained nurses, typically in the participants’ 
homes. 
Cognitive ability 
General mental ability was tested using the Alice Heim 4 Part 1 Test (AH4) of 
General Intelligence. Administration and scoring were carried out using the 
instructions in the test manual (Heim, 1970). The test overall has 65 items, from 
which the participant completes as many as possible in ten minutes. A practice test 
was given before the test proper. There are verbal and numerical reasoning items in 
the test, and separate scores were obtained for each subset. Of the verbal items: 11 are 
verbal opposites, 10 are verbal synonyms, and 11 are verbal analogies. All verbal 
items take the form of a stem and then provide five possible answer options from 
which the participant chooses one. The numerical items comprise: 12 series 
completion items, 11 arithmetic items, and 10 numerical reasoning items. For all 
numerical items, the answer must be written down and no answer options are given. 
Therefore, although the opposites and synonyms assess vocabulary, the verbal 
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analogies and the three numerical types of item assess more fluid skills, including 
reasoning and working memory. 
Reaction times 
Simple and four-choice reaction times were measured using a portable device 
that was designed for and used in the UK Health and Lifestyle Survey (Cox, Huppert, 
& Whichelow, 1993). This was described in detail and illustrated by us previously 
(Deary, Der, & Ford, 2001). The device is a shallow, rectangular box. On the top face 
of the box there is a high-contrast LCD screen. Below that, there are five response 
keys arranged in a shallow arc and numbered, from left to right, 1, 2, 0, 3, 4. The 
simple reaction time test precedes the four-choice reaction time test. There are 8 
practice trials and 20 test trials. The participant rests the second finger of the preferred 
hand on the 0 key. After a zero occurs on the LCD screen the participant presses the 
key as quickly as possible. The mean and standard deviation of the 20 simple reaction 
time trials are calculated. The four-choice reaction time test has 8 practice trials and 
40 test trials. The participant rests the second and third fingers of the left and right 
hands on, respectively, the keys marked 1, 2, 3, 4. After a number appears on the LCD 
screen the participant presses the appropriate key as quickly as possible. Each of the 
four numbers appears ten times, in a randomised order. Separate means and standard 
deviations are computed for correct and incorrect trials. Data for correct trials only 
were used in the present study. For both the simple and four-choice reaction time 
trials there was a variable interval of between 1 s and 3 s between the participant’s 
response and onset of the next stimulus. As described previously, only those 
participants with fewer than ten incorrect responses in the four-choice reaction time 
test were used in the present analyses (Deary & Der, 2005a). For the purposes of the 
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longitudinal models conducted here, only the means of the simple and choice reaction 
time tasks were used. 
Statistical analyses 
Distributions of and associations between the cognitive test and reaction time 
variables are described using means, standard deviations and Pearson correlation 
coefficients. The reaction time variables (simple and choice reaction time means) 
were positively skewed at both time points. This was rectified by transformation using 
the negative reciprocal, and scaled by factor of 10000 for computational stability. The 
cross-lagged panel data formed from the reaction time and cognitive data in waves 1 
and 4 are analysed using structural equation modelling (SEM), performed using the 
statistical package R (Ihaka & Gentleman, 1996). The SEM model contains eight 
observed variables: two reaction time measures and two AH4 measures at waves 1 
and 4. There are four latent factors, two of which are exogenous; i.e. the reaction time 
and AH4 latent traits at wave 1. The data covariance matrix was estimated using a 
maximum likelihood procedure to impute missing values (Little & Rubin, 1987), as 
implemented by R’s function ‘mlest’ in package ‘mvnmle’ (Ihaka & Gentleman, 
1996). The fit to these data was compared to fits using the same model where the 
covariance matrix was estimated using pairwise complete observations, and also using 
complete cases only. There was negligible difference between these fits. For example, 
the comparative fit index was 0.993 for the imputed data and 0.990 for the complete-
cases data. Model parameters were estimated by maximum likelihood using R’s 
function ‘sem’ in package ‘sem’. The starting values were the defaults chosen by the 
program. Goodness-of-fit indices for the imputed data are described in the results 
section. 
Results 
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Means and standard deviations are shown in Table 1 for all participants who 
provided some data on the variables to be used in the present analyses (N = 679), and 
for the subsample with complete data (N = 414). The means and standard deviations 
for all participants were estimated using maximum likelihood. There are only small 
differences between them. Participants were, on average, about 13 years older at wave 
4 than they were at wave 1. 
Based on pairwise deletion of cases, participants scored less well on all four 
variables at wave 4 compared with wave 1: AH4 verbal, t(428) = 5.82, p < .001; AH4 
numerical, t(428) = 8.22, p < .001; simple reaction time mean, t(489) = 2.03, p = .040; 
and four-choice reaction time mean, t(489) = 5.30, p < .001. The stability coefficients 
(Pearson correlation coefficients between these variables across time using pairwise 
elimination of data) of the four variables were as follows (all p < .001): AH4 verbal, 
r(427) = .72; AH4 numerical, r(427) = .78; simple reaction time mean, r(488) = .38; 
and four-choice reaction time mean, r(488) = .56. The correlation matrices between 
all variables—for all cases (these correlations were estimated using maximum 
likelihood) and complete cases—are shown in Table 2. 
Ignoring, for now, the path weights in the model, the form of the structural 
equation model for the data is shown in Figure 1. The measurement model for the 
reaction time latent trait at waves 1 and 4 included simple reaction time mean and 
four-choice reaction time mean. The measurement model for cognitive ability at 
waves 1 and 4 included the AH4 verbal and numerical subtests. Stability coefficients 
for the reaction time and cognitive ability latent traits were included. The reaction 
time and cognitive ability latent traits were allowed to correlate at wave 1, as were 
their disturbance terms at wave 4. Both cross-lagged path weights were estimated (the 
F1 to F4 path was eliminated in our preferred, final model; see below), and their 
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values, significance levels and difference were of principal interest. Associations are 
clearly constrained by the temporal sequence of measurement, and the markers of the 
two types of latent trait (reaction time and cognitive ability) are clearly separated. 
Prior to model fitting we investigated the factorial invariance of the latent traits 
across time by fitting a series of models with increasingly restrictive equality 
constraints on model parameters. Parameters are constrained to be equal for the same 
measure taken at the two time points. We fit a hierarchy of three constrained models 
(Table 3). In the first constrained model, the factor loadings of corresponding 
measures at time 1 and time 2 are constrained to be equal in order to establish metric 
invariance (Horn & McArdle, 1992). In the second model the residual variances of 
corresponding measures at time 1 and time 2 are constrained to be equal, to explore 
the possibility of a difference in the amount of unexplained variance between the two 
time points. In the third and final model the intercepts associated with corresponding 
measures at time 1 and time 2 are constrained to be equal (though they were not 
expected to be so), resulting in a model that assumes the means are the same across 
the time points. Constraints are applied progressively: at each step the model includes 
the constraints applied in previous steps. At each step we compared the model’s 
goodness of fit with the fit of the unconstrained model. These comparisons are 
presented in Table 3. The goodness-of-fit does not significantly deteriorate with 
respect to the unconstrained model until the final equality constraint (equality of 
means across time) is applied. We conclude from this that the model’s factorial 
configuration explains the measurement variance-covariance structure at time 1 and 
time 2, and is not of itself biased by failing to account for extraneous effects 
introduced between the time points. We would of course expect performance to 
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decline (change in intercepts) somewhat between these time points, as indicated by 
the difference in the above-described means. 
The final model is shown in Figure 1. The overall model Chi square statistic for 
all data is 38.4 (d.f. = 14, p < .01). We attribute the slightly inflated (significant) 
model chi square to lack of multivariate normality in the sample distribution, and this 
was confirmed by a Shapiro-Wilks test (W = .97, p < .01). All the other goodness-of-
fit indices suggest a good fit. The RMSEA was 0.051. The SRMSR was 0.022. The 
comparative fit index = 0.993. The highest absolute standardized residual was 0.07. 
All of the path weights in the model in Figure 1 have p values < .01.  The only 
changes made to the model were: the addition of a correlated error term between the 
simple reaction time mean at waves 1 and 4; and the dropping of the non-significant 
path from F1 to F4 (standardized estimate = 0.05, p = .07). Note that the relative sizes 
of the path weights F1 to F4 versus F2 to F3 do not reflect the relative sizes of the 
relevant correlations in Table 2. This is due to the different stability coefficients of the 
two latent traits. A very similar example of this phenomenon may be seen in Rogosa 
(1980, Figure 4, example (e), p. 252). The model which included the path from F1 to 
F4 had a Chi square statistic of 35.0 (d.f. = 13, p < .01). The difference between this 
and the chi square for the final model is not significant, and the more parsimonious 
one (Figure 1) is preferred. Differences in parameter estimates between the two 
models, other than F1-F4 were less than or equal to .02. A model which omitted the 
path from F3 to F4 had a Chi square statistic of 101.7 (d.f. = 1, p < .01). The 
difference between this and the chi square for the final model is significant, and the 
final model (Figure 1) is preferred. 
In the model shown in Figure 1 all of the manifest variables have moderate or 
high loadings on the associated latent traits. The association between the latent 
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reaction time trait and the cognitive ability trait at wave 1 is -.49; people with higher 
AH4 scores take less time to respond. Note that this association is in a sample with 
very small chronological age variation. The stability coefficient of the cognitive 
ability latent trait (.89) across 13 years is stronger than the reaction time latent trait 
(.49). A principal concern is the relative strength of the two cross-lagged associations. 
There was a significant association (-.21) between the cognitive ability trait at wave 1 
and the reaction time trait at wave 4. The association between the reaction time latent 
trait at wave 1 and the cognitive ability trait at wave 4 was non-significant. However, 
this does not mean that the two path weights are significantly different. Therefore, we 
conducted a likelihood ratio test comparing two models. These were similar to that in 
Figure 1, but had both F1 to F4 and F2 to F3 paths included. One of these models had 
an equality constraint imposed between F1 to F4 and F2 to F3. The other did not. This 
is equivalent to a direct test of the difference between these paths, analogous to 
SPSS/AMOS’s ‘critical ratio for differences’. When all data were tested, the model 
without the equality constraint fitted significantly better, Chi square = 7.0, d.f. = 1, p 
= .008. When those with complete data were tested, the model without the equality 
constraint tended toward fitting significantly better, Chi square = 3.1, d.f. = 1, p = 
.078. Thus, reaction time performance at wave 4 is associated with better previous 
reaction time performance and cognitive ability, but cognitive ability at wave 4 is 
associated with only prior ability on the same trait. 
Discussion 
Reaction times and the cognitive ability test scores obtained here show 
substantial stability across a period of about 13 years. The two constructs have a 
contemporaneous correlation, with those who score better on the verbal and numerical 
reasoning items having faster reaction times. As Lemke and Zimprich (2005) 
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explained, this correlation on its own is valuable because, given the very narrow age 
range of the sample, it gives a speed-intelligence association that is orthogonal to age. 
The one significant cross lagged association—which was also significantly different 
from the other one—across the 13 year gap was not in the expected direction. It was 
the prior cognitive ability test score that was associated with the later efficiency of 
processing, rather than vice versa. It had been hypothesised that, as processing 
efficiency deteriorates from age 56 onwards, which it does (Deary & Der, 2005a; Der 
& Deary, 2006), it would lead the decline in verbal and numerical reasoning. Here, 
though, it was the AH4 scores that provided the lead variable. Lemke and Zimprich 
(2005) called the processing speed theory into question because processing speed and 
memory changes shared only 37% of variance over a four year period. Here, it may be 
called into question because of the lead-lag association found in the much longer 
follow-up period used here. 
There are at least two possible explanations for this finding. First, it might be 
that people with higher cognitive ability make better use of limited practice in getting 
to know how to perform at their optimal level, even in quite simple tasks like reaction 
time. Thus, this would agree with findings that IQ is associated with the early stages 
of skill development (Ackerman, 1988). It would also accord with the finding that the 
amount of learning with a processing speed task in a single session is predictive of 
relative improvement in the same task across a six year period (Zimprich, Hofer, & 
Aartsen, 2004). The participants had experience of the reaction time device for only 
three brief periods: at waves 1, 3 (the wave 3 reaction time data were not included 
here; participants did not take AH4 at this time; see Deary & Der, 2005a) and 4, each 
for about 10 to 15 minutes. Therefore, even when it was seen for the third time across 
Reaction time and intelligence from age 56 to 69 years 16 
a period of about 13 years, it represented a quite novel task, to which the more 
cognitively able individuals might have become better accustomed. 
Second, another possibility is that the cognitive ability contribution from wave 1 
to reaction time performance at wave 4 might be more substantive. It is known that 
the reaction times gathered from the device used here are associated with later 
mortality. Those with slower reaction times, and those whose reaction times 
deteriorate more across a fixed period are at higher risk of earlier death (Deary & Der, 
2005b; Shipley, Der, Taylor, & Deary, 2006, 2007). The AH4 test is a higher-level, 
more complex examination of cognitive function, and lower scores in middle age are 
also associated with higher mortality risk (Deary & Der, 2005b). It is likely that the 
AH4 test score contains variance on mental capabilities other than those associated 
with reaction time performance. It contains many items that call upon fluid reasoning 
and working memory skills with numerical and verbal materials, in addition to 
knowledge of word meanings. In addition, these additional capabilities might be 
associated with knowledge and thinking styles that help to preserve speed of 
information processing with age. Therefore, it might be the case that the relatively 
broad range of mental skills tapped by the AH4 test capture variance associated with 
living styles that militate against the age-related decline speed of information 
processing. 
In part, the present results might accord with the findings of Finkel et al. (2007), 
with the Swedish Adoption/Twin Study of Aging. They found a significant dynamic 
effect from verbal ability, which they deemed to represent crystallised ability, to later 
processing speed, but not vice versa. However, it should be emphasised that these 
effects were not significantly different. The verbal and numerical reasoning items in 
the AH4 will draw upon vocabulary and number skills, which are relatively resistant 
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to ageing (Schaie, 2005), though the items do involve active reasoning. On the other 
hand, the tests used by Finkel et al. (2007) to assess verbal ability included tests of 
information, synonyms, and analogies, and at least the last of these might involve 
active verbal reasoning1. 
Strengths of the study include the large number of participants who are 
reasonably representative of the background population. They were examined on the 
same mental ability and reaction time tests 13 years apart, and there were enough 
manifest variables to allow latent variable modelling. The processing speed measures 
were experimental-psychology-type reaction time measures, rather than psychometric 
tests, which tend to be used in most studies (e.g. Finkel et al., 2007). The latter are 
less satisfactory, because they have less well-controlled stimulus-response 
characteristics (Deary, 2000). This echoes the comment by Hertzog et al. (2003) that 
psychometric speed tasks tend to be relatively complex and, as such, result in 
artificially high correlations between processing speed and general mental ability. The 
study design is rare in answering Zimprich’s (2002) comment that the age range of 
cognitive ageing samples is usually much larger than the time period covered by the 
study: here, the age range was very small and the time period much larger. The study 
is limited by there being only two occasions on which the variables were both 
examined, and by there being no assessments of cognitive ability before age 56. 
Caution is needed in the interpretation of cross-lagged panels of correlations, 
particularly where the lagged variables have different stabilities. Rogosa’s (1980) 
classic paper demonstrated that causal priority can be spuriously attributed to the 
variable with the lower stability. By taking the differential stability into account this 
can be avoided. His example (e) in Figure 4 discusses a situation similar to our 
findings here. 
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Further waves of data would allow for growth parameters to be estimated, and 
the observation of differing dynamic effects (Ferrer-Caja & McArdle, 2003). 
Therefore, non-linear ageing effects could not be examined. As with any longitudinal 
study, there were missing data. However, the models were run including only those 
participants with complete data and the results were very similar (data not shown, but 
available from the authors). It should be noted that any comments and conclusions 
that are made concerning processing speed are only relevant to the reaction time tasks 
that were used here. It cannot be assumed that other reaction time tasks and, more 
generally, other processing speed tasks—for example, psychometric tasks like digit 
symbol and psychophysical tasks like inspection time—would give the same results. 
Moreover, the general mental test used here was short and limited to verbal and 
numerical reasoning. 
More definite information about the place of processing speed and its place in 
cognitive ageing will be known when the biological foundations of both are better 
understood. Evidence from the Swedish Adoption/Twin Study of Aging showed that 
there were substantial shared genetic influences between the intercepts of processing 
speed and the intercepts of verbal, spatial and memory ability and, similarly, between 
the accelerated declines of these abilities with age (Finkel et al., 2005). Processing 
speed was assessed using psychometric tests rather than reaction time. One candidate 
for a biological foundation of processing speed differences is the relative integrity of 
the brain’s white matter, and some have suggested that reaction time mediates the 
influence of white matter integrity on more general cognitive ability in old age (Deary 
et al., 2006). It has also been shown, using voxel-based morphometric magnetic 
resonance imaging, that the regions of white matter that, if preserved in old age, are 
correlated with successful digit symbol performance are almost identical (72% of the 
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voxels in common) to those associated with general mental ability (Staff, Murray, 
Deary, & Whalley, 2006). 
In conclusion, the present data do not support the hypothesis that efficiency of 
processing speed contributes to successful ageing in a more general cognitive ability 
test. Rather, the reverse was found, provoking the suggestion that more omnibus 
mental tests capture some variance that is related to later advantages in processing 
speed. 
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Footnote 
1As suggested by a referee, we re-ran the structural equation models with the 
AH4 Verbal and Numerical reasoning scores individually. These two halves of the 
Alice Heim 4 part 1 correlate very highly (Table 2), indicating that, despite different 
surface content, they assess very similar reasoning skills. The crossed-lagged results 
are less clear when the Verbal and Numerical scores are run separately in models with 
processing speed. The findings from these models are available from the authors. We 
suggest that longitudinal models of processing speed versus verbal and numerical 
ability—i.e. examining each, specifically—would require multiple assessments of 
these abilities that were specifically designed for the purpose. What the present study 
achieves, ability-wise, is a reliable general ability/reasoning latent trait. 
 
Reaction time and intelligence from age 56 to 69 years 27 
Table 1 
Descriptive Data of Participants With and Without Complete Data 
 
 Participants with complete data (N = 414)  All data (imputed 
using maximum 
likelihood) (N = 679) 
 Mean SD Skew Kurtosis  Mean SD 
Alice Heim 4 Verbal, wave 1 15.4 5.0 0.22 -0.37  14.5 5.2 
Alice Heim 4 Numerical, wave 1 14.7 5.7 0.01 -0.43  13.6 6.0 
Alice Heim 4 Verbal, wave 4 14.3 5.1 0.33 -0.02  14.1 5.3 
Alice Heim 4 Numerical, wave 4 13.2 5.9 0.08 -0.64  12.9 6.1 
        
Simple reaction time mean, wave 1 339.0 100.2 2.00 5.40  346.8 104.2 
Choice reaction time mean, wave 1 704.0 87.2 0.53 0.85  718.0 96.5 
Simple reaction time mean, wave 4 354.2 115.7 1.61 2.62  357.7 119.9 
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Choice reaction time mean, wave 4 726.4 104.3 1.08 2.54  733.7 110.8 
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Table 2 
Correlations Among the Variables Used in the Structural Equation Modelling 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Mean SD 
1. Alice Heim 4 Verbal, wave 1 - .841 .720 .709 -.188 -.367 -.252 -.333 14.50 5.21 
2. Alice Heim 4 Numerical, wave 1 .850 - .746 .792 -.232 -.394 -.289 -.380 13.55 5.96 
3. Alice Heim 4 Verbal, wave 4 .744 .758 - .847 -.192 -.379 -.375 -.492 13.53 5.34 
4. Alice Heim 4 Numerical, wave 4 .736 .800 .854 - -.212 -.388 -.349 -.467 12.20 6.13 
5. Simple reaction time mean, wave 1 -.234 -.261 -.224 -.236 - .444 .364 .265 -31.08 7.08 
6. Choice reaction time mean, wave 1 -.431 -.453 -.426 -.433 .510 - .264 .547 -14.21 1.82 
7. Simple reaction time mean, wave 4 -.267 -.292 -.364 -.349 .412 .314 - .568 -30.19 7.85 
8. Choice reaction time mean, wave 4 -.375 -.409 -.511 -.489 .311 .583 .582 - -13.81 1.96 
 
Note. Coefficients above the diagonal are for the 414 participants with complete data (listwise deletion). For descriptives see Table 1. 
Coefficients below the diagonal are for all cases (N = 679), calculated from the maximum likelihood estimate of the variance-covariance matrix. 
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For raw descriptives see Table 1. The mean and SD given here are the maximum likelihood estimates from transformed data using all cases. 
These are included to allow re-modelling of data using the covariance matrix. RT values are -1/RT x 10,000. 
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Table 3 
Results of Modelling Data for Factorial Invariance 
 
Equality constraint Model Chi square Change in d.f. Change in 
chi square 
p for > in 
chi square 
Unconstrained 31.08    
Factor loadings 33.73 2 2.65 .27 
Residual variances 40.12 6 9.04 .17 
Intercepts 111.51 10 80.43 <.001 
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1. Results of the structural equation modelling of simple (SRT) and choice 
(CRT) reaction time and Alice Heim 4 Part 1 from age 56 to 69 in the Twenty-07 
participants. This model is for all data, with missing values imputed by maximum 
likelihood (see text). Numbers alongside arrows can be squared to show the variance 
shared by adjacent variables. The dotted line represents the only pathway that was 
found to have p > .05 (this path was eliminated and the parameters re-estimated, and 
presented here). All others are p < .01. Path weights marked with an asterisk are 
covariances between residual (error or disturbance) terms. For fit statistics and model 
description see text. 
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